Woodinville v. SHARE/WHEEL
Summary: 
SHARE/WHEEL violated its 2004 contract with Woodinville by failing to apply for a tent city permit far enough in advance. Therefore the city properly blocked the 2006 effort to locate Tent City 4 in Woodinville. Excluding Tent City 4 did not violate Northshore United Church of Christ’s (“the church”) exercise of religious freedom.
Discussion:
A persistent theme runs through Judge Cox’s opinion, the theme of an underdeveloped trial record. Several issues in the case would have intellectually benefitted from further argument at the trial level. It is doubtful, though, that more facts would have changed the opinion.
The heart of the issue in this case is Tent City 4’s perpetually short/urgent timeline. SHARE/WHEEL and the church had promised Woodinville in 2004 that they would not locate a tent city in Woodinville without first applying for a permit in a timely fashion. When the organizations sought to return Tent City 4 to Woodinville in 2006, though, they applied for a permit fewer than thirty days in advance. The city normally requires between thirty and forty days to process a special use application. Tent cities are more complex and contentious than run-of-the-mill special use permits making every day of advance notice useful. The private agreement between the church, SHARE/WHEEL, and Woodinville guaranteed Woodinville the full length of planning time and when SHARE/WHEEL applied late, no other reason for blocking the tent city was necessary.
As a secondary argument, the church argued that Woodinville’s denial of the permit impermissibly burdened its exercise of religion. Caring for the poor is traditionally considered an exercise of religion and is therefore privileged. Sheltering the poor, though, is but one way to care for the poor and is not specially protected. This was the argument that would have most benefited from more facts. In order to win this argument, the church needed to show one of three things: greater protection for its religious exercise under the Washington state constitution than under the Federal constitution; or that the restriction was solely intended to restrain the church; or that the restriction effectively restrained only the church. SHARE/WHEEL did not thoroughly discuss the Washington constitution nor did it offer evidence of Woodinville’s intent. SHARE/WHEEL also failed to demonstrate that others had avoided Woodinville’s moratorium on special uses in residential zones. Since the city had treated SHARE/WHEEL and the church exactly as it treated all non-religious organizations, the claims to special religious privilege failed.
The opinion closes with a short discussion regarding the city’s attorney fees. Based upon the course of the case, both sides are responsible for their own fees.
Sources:
- Slip Opinion (PDF)
Lakeland Estates v. King County
Unpublished Opnion
Summary: An owner may not sell the lots of a trailer park to the residents when the sale is contrary to the land’s zoning and the trailer park was approved as a planned unit development (PUD).
Discussion: Lakeland Estates, which owns a great deal of land in southern King County, applied for and received permission to create a 13 unit mobile home park in 1979. From the facts in the case, it appears that Lakeland operated the mobile home park without incident for nearly twenty-four years. In 2003, Lakeland decided it was willing to sell individual residents of the park the land under their homes. The ordinance approving the park, though, specified that the park not be subdivided.
Unlike a rezone, which changes the range of land uses available at a site, a PUD retains the zoning limitations and carves out a single exception. In this case, the PUD permitted the use of the parcel as a mobile home park with thirteen homes. Any other use would have required new approval under the standard zoning rules.
While the law is clear on this point, the language used at the time is rather confusing. In this case, the PUD used the word “lot” to mean two very different things without any attempt to clarify. The PUD refers the mobile home sites as “lots” and without differentiating the legal meaning of “lot” as an individual tax parcel.
Perhaps relying on this ambiguity, Lakeland sought approval to divide the property through a binding site plan (BSP). The BSP process is an alternative to the usual land division process. BSPs, though, only bypass the usual process if the property will later be used by a condominium entity. Since Lakeland was seeking to fragment all ownership of the mobile home sites, the BSP process did not provide a loophole.
Lakeland had another method available to sell the mobile home sites. As the court notes, Lakeland could have created a formal residential community, a condominium association for example, and transferred ownership to the residents through that structure.
Sources:
- Slip Opinion (PDF)
Bilcher v. Cowlitz County
Unpublished Opnion
Summary: A landowner’s appeal from a hearing examiner’s decision was invalid because he failed to serve a copy of the appeal to a person possibly misidentified by the hearing examiner as an owner of the property. The landowner was required to challenge the hearing examiner’s determination of ownership or to serve the person.
Discussion: The court applied the law in a clear, straight-forward manner to an interesting set of facts. John Bilcher purchased a lot in a senior community from Gabriel Goro through private contract. Once in control of the property, Mr. Bilcher began, with his friends and family, to use the property as an RV campground and shooting range. Such activities were not allowed by the land’s zoning and the county acted to enforce the zoning rules.
Ultimately, the Hearing Examiner denied Mr. Bilcher’s tardy request for a special use permit. In the written decision, the examiner named Mr. Goro as an owner of the property. This was a natural, and perhaps correct, action since Mr. Goro remained on the tax rolls as the owner of the property. Mr. Bilcher and a co-purchaser had assumed the full responsibilities of ownership, including property tax payments, but had not changed the ownership records at the county assessor’s office.
The key to the case is the hearing examiner opinion listed Mr. Goro as an owner. Since Mr. Bilcher did not challenge the examiner’s finding on that point, Mr. Bilcher became bound to treat Mr. Goro as an owner for the purposes of the decision – including his appeal.
Here’s the statute:
RCW 36.70C.040 LUPA provides:
(2) A land use petition is barred, and the court may not grant review, unless the petition is timely filed with the court and timely served on the following persons who shall be parties to review of the land use petition:
....
(b) Each of the following persons if the person is not the petitioner:
....
(ii) Each person identified by name and address in the local jurisdiction’s written decision as an owner of the property at issue.
Sources:
- Slip Opinion (PDF)
Redmond Accepts Tent City
The Redmond City Council accepted Tent City 4’s presence in the city through a 5-1 vote last Tuesday. The council was reinstating the permit issued by its planning director and overturned by the hearing examiner. The council’s move was a smart one, but I wouldn’t be surprised by an appeal.
Tent City 4 has been in Redmond since February 11th, but the permitted process began considerably earlier. The timeline for these permits needs improvement statewide.
The most contentious point, though, remains in dispute:
The council’s decision to uphold the permit does not resolve one disputed condition whether the required background checks will be conducted by the King County Sheriff’s Office, as Tent City 4 has proposed, or by Redmond police, as some Redmond residents have insisted.
[Harmon] said council members may have to determine whether the land-use code extends to this type of permit condition.
Source:
- Tent city may stay at Redmond church, Seattle Times, Mar. 28, 2007, Page B3
From the April 1, 2007 Seattle Times.
CORRECTION:
Comments in this story Wednesday about Tent City’s stay at St. Jude Catholic Church in Redmond were incorrectly attributed to planning director Rob Odle. Rod T. Harmon, attorney for St. Jude, was the one who said the City Council may have to make a determination about land-use code. He also said the church will not have to pay fines for hosting the encampment without a valid permit. But that has not yet been determined.
Olympia Officially Allows Unofficial Tent City
Olympia has reached an agreement with the church hosting a 30 person tent city. Under the agreement, the tent city will wrap up May 19th, be subject to health inspections, and will not be required to seek a permit.